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lN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintif!-Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

ROBERT "BUDDY" WASHINGTON,

12088

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The appellant, Robert "Buddy" Washington, appeals
from a judgment on a jury verdict of guilty to a charge
of receiving stolen property having a value in excess of
fifty dollars ($50.00) and being an habitual criminal, rendered in the Second Judicial District in and for Weber
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dallas H. Young,
Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged by information with receiving stolen property having a value in excess of fifty dollars
($50.00) and being an habitual criminal. The jury found
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Robert "Buddy" "Vashington guilty on both charges and
he was sentenced by the court to a term in the Utah State
Prison not to exceed five years on the charge of receiving
stolen goods, and a term of not less than fifteen years on
the charge of being an habitual criminal, said terms to be
served concurrently.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the decision of the District
Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the fall of 1969 a series of burglaries were reported
to the Ogden Police Department. Among the items listed
as stolen from the different homes were the following:
1.

A polaroid camera which cost $225.00 new;

2.

A persian lamb coat which was purchased at
Z.C.M.I. for $550.00;

3.

A black and white television set valued at $60.00;

4.

A color television set valued at approximately
$400.00;

5.

An electric hair dryer valued at $23.79;

6.

A pendant watch;

7.

A shot gun.

About the same time Miss Shirley Owens (or Shirley
Gallegos, hereinafter referred to as Shirley Owens) testified that the appellant and three of his friends brought
some items to her house (T. 65, 82). Among the items
brought were a colored and a black and white television set,
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a persian lamb coat, 2 rifles, a pendant watch and a hair
dryer (T. 65). Shirley Owens asked the appellant where
he got these items but he refused to tell her (T. 70). Appellant also went over to Mr. and Mrs. Lester Hall who
lived in the duplex opposite Shirley and asked them if they
would be interested in purchasing some items (T. 43). Mr.
Hall purchased a couple of rifles (T. 43). Then appellant
brought over a polaroid camera and a radio (T. 57). Mr.
Hall purchased the polaroid camera and the appellant gave
him the radio (T. 59). Later that night the appellant sold
Mrs. Hall a colored television set and asked her to pick it
up at Shirley Owens' place (T. 57). The appellant explained that he was leaving town and wanted to sell those
items (T. 48). A black persian lamb coat was given by
Miss Owens to Mrs. Hall (T. 71). However, Shirley Owens
kept the hair dryer brought in by the appellant and his
friends (T. 69).
Ten days later police officers Balls and Buzick picked
up all the items either sold or given by the appellant to Mr.
and Mrs. Hall, Shirley Owens and Mr. McClellan (T. 9296). [Mr. McClellan had agreed to store the colored television set for Mrs. Hall.] All items picked up were identified by the victims of the aforementioned burglaries as belonging to them.
Mr. Howard Wade testified that he is the owner of
Exhibit "A", the polaroid camera (T. 4, 5). C. W. Hortman
testified that he owned Bxhibit "B", a black persian lamb
jacket (T. 11). Exhibit "C" which appellant brought to
Shirley was identified by Dale Iverson as his black and
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white television set (T. 16). Virginia Chase claimed ownership of Exhibits "D" and "E" which were a Westinghouse
radio and pendant watch respectively (T. 23, 26). Mrs.
Muriel Hardy testified that the color television set, Exhibit
"I", the antique gun, Exhibit "G", and the hair dryer, Exhibit "H", all belonged to her (T. 32, 33). The total value
of all assets brought to Shirley Owens and Mr. and Mrs.
Hall by Buddy Washington when new, except for the antique gun and pendant watch (which were hard to value),
was over twelve hundred and sixty-five dollars ($1265.00).
The appellant claims a Mrs. Hussy wanted him to sell
those items to post bail for her husband (T. 115), and that,
contrary to Shirley Owens' testimony, Mrs. Hussy and another person, and not himself, took the stolen items to
Shirley Owens' house (T. 124). However, testimony and
evidence were introduced to impeach the appellant's testimony. The evidence was Mr. Howard Wade's credit card
taken from appellant's person in Wyoming and also some
credit slips with Howard Wade's forged name and appellant's address. The credit cards were taken from Mr.
Wade's home along with the polaroid camera. There was
also testimony that appellant was wearing shoes exactly
the same as those stolen from the Chase home ( T. 26, 27) .
After a full trial the jury found appellant guilty of
possession of stolen goods in excess of fifty dollars
($50.00), pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-1~ (1953).
Trial was then continued on appellant's second charge,
to-wit: that appellant is an habitual criminal in violation of
Utah Code Ann. ~ 76-1-18 (1953). Mr. James W. Johnson
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employed as a records and identification officer at the Utah
State Prison (T. 143), brought copies of the commitments,
Exhibits 1 and 2. The commitments showed Buddy Washington was committed on two different occasions to the
Utah State Prison (T. 149, 150). The jury found the appellant guilty of being in the status of an habitual criminal
and the court then set a time for sentencing
157, 158).
Appellant was then sentenced to a term of not more than
five years and not less than fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.

er.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE LOWER COURT'S VERDICT OF
GUILTY.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-12 (1953) states what elements are necessary for a person to be found guilty of receiving stolen property.
"Every person who, for his own gain or to prevent the owner from again possessing his property,
buys or receives any personal property exceeding
$50.00 in value, knowing the same to have been
stolen, is punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison not exceeding five years; if the value of the
property so bought or received is $50 or less in
value, he is guilty of a misdemeanor."
Thus, there are three elements that have to be proven
to find an accused guilty of receiving stolen property, towit:
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( 1)

the accused must buy or receive the property;

(2)

the value must be in excess of $50.00 dollars;

the accused must know that the personal property was stolen.
(3)

The jury found the appellant guilty, but he contends that
the evidence did not support the jury's verdict. Respondent
submits that the evidence justifies the conviction.
First there must be proof of an unlawful taking of
personal property that was or is in the possession of the
accused.
"In any case, before the inference may be made
from possession of stolen property alone, there must
be proof of an unlawful taking, coupled with convincing identification of the property stolen." Jenkins v. United States, 361 F. 2d 615 at 619 (10th
Cir. 1966).
No one disputes that the property was stolen. Four people
testified in court that they had property stolen. Those
same people also made positive identification that those
items sold and given away by appellant were the same
items that were burglarized from their homes (T. 4, 5, 16,
23, 26, 32, 33) . Each burglary victim had some identifying
mark establishing that particular item as their o-wn.
All of these stolen goods, as testimony proves, were at
one time or another in the hands of Buddy Washington.
Testimony of Mr. Hall :
"MR. STRATFORD: Well, that[ stolen rifles
and polaroid camera] was in Shirley's home when
you bought it, was it?
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MR. HALL: No, no.
MR. STRATFORD: You don't know if it was?
MR. HALL: I don't know where it come from.
I know he [Buddy Washington] brought it there.
I don't know whether it come from Shirley's home"
( T. 49) . (Emphasis added.)
Testimony of Mrs. Hall :
"MR. STRATFORD: Do you know whether or
not most of them [stolen radio, rifles, polaroid camera, and color television] had been in Mrs. Owens'
home?
MRS. HALL : I had never seen them before
until he [Buddy Washington] brought them in" (T.
59). (Emphasis added.)
Shirley Owens' testimony:
"MR. STRATFORD : Alright. Now then, can
you tell us approximately - was it in the month
of September or October that he [Buddy Washington] brought things [stolen goods] to your home?
SHIRLEY OWENS: I would say he did, yes.
MR. STRATFORD: He did?
SHIRLEY OWENS: Well, I can't say he did.
There was other people I didn't know there.
MR. STRATFORD: Was he with them?
SHIRLEY OWENS: Yeah, he was there. He
is the only one I knew" ( T. 79) .
The testimony of four individuals positively identifying their stolen property, coupled with the testimony of
three other persons stating appellant brought the same
burglarized goods to them, should be ample proof that the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
goods were stolen and that Buddy Washington had possession of them. In California, that is all that is required to
convict a person for receiving stolen property.
"In prosecution for receiving stolen goods,
where there was evidence that defendant had received the stolen property, evidence that he had
paid anything for it was unnecessary, since the
offense is committed when the person either buys
or receives stolen property." People v. Smith, 26
Cal. 2d 854, 161 P. 2d 941 at 942 (1945).
The second element needed for a conviction is that the
value of the goods must be in excess of $50.00. The following items were stolen: a polaroid camera, new cost $225.00;
black persian lamb jacket, new cost $550.00; black and
white television set, present value $60.00; Westinghouse
radio, new cost $7.97; hair dryer, new cost $23.97; color
television set, new cost $400.00; pendant watch and antique
gun (upon which no actual cost could be given). Total
value of the above items when new was in excess of
$1265.00. All these prices were testified to in court, yet
counsel for appellant contends there was not proof enough
to support this element of the crime. The respondent acknowledges that some of the items were two years old, towit: the color television and black persian lamb coat, but
common sense tells us the price would still be way above
$50.00.
"While jurors are not permitted to speculate as
to value of the stolen property in prosecution for
receiving such they should be permitted to use common sense." State v. Grijalua, 8 Ariz. App. 205, 445
· P. 2d 88 at 90 (1968).
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The jury did use common sense in our case. They came
back with a verdict finding the appellant guilty of receiving stolen property in excess of $50.00.
As stated in State v. White, 107 Utah 84, 152 P. 2d
88 (1944) :
"In prosecution for rece1vmg stolen jewelry,
testimony warranted finding that value of stolen
property exceeded $50.00 and warranted refusal of
defendant's motion to reduce charge from a felony
to a misdemeanor." Id. at 89.
The third element needed to prove appelJant guilty of
the crime is that he knew the goods were stolen.
The appellant, Buddy Washington, had items that
when new were valued over $1265.00. Yet the total amount
received for those items was $72.00. He sold a two year old
color television set for $30.00 which cost $400.00 new. He
sold a $225.00 polaroid camera set for $12.00. He gave
away a $34.97 hair dryer, a $7.97 Westinghouse radio, and
a $550.00 black persian lamb coat! As stated in People v.
Reynolds, 149 Cal. 2d 290, 308 P. 2d 48 (1957).
"Sale of property at a price disproportionately
low compared to its value may be a suspicious circumstance justifying inference of knowledge that
property was stolen." Id. at 51.
Then when asked by Shirley Owens where he got all these
items Washington refused to tell her (T. 70). However,;
when questioned on the stand appellant had a readily available story - he explained he was selling the stolen items
for a friend, Mr. Hussey. However, evidence was introduced

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

which impeached appellant's testimony by showing that
stolen credit cards taken from Mr. Wade's home were in
appellant's possession. Needless to say, there is a big question as to where Washington would get the stolen credit
cards when he was only selling the items at the request of
Mr. Hussey. As stated in Findley v. United States, 362 F.
2d 921 (9th Cir. 1966) :
"Possession of property recently stolen if not
satisfactorily explained, is circumstantial evidence
from which a jury may properly infer and find that
the person in possession had knowledge that the
property had been stolen." Id. at 923.
The same proposition was also stated in State v.
Murphy, ______ Or. ______ , 455 P. 2d 178 (1969) :
"Evidence, including defendant's explanation
for possession which a jury was entitled to disbelieve and from which guilty know ledge could be inferred, was sufficient to warrant finding of knowledge in prosecution for concealing stolen property."
Id. at 179.
Appellant knew the items he sold were stolen, that's
why he sold or gave away $1265.00 worth of goods for
$72.00, refused to tell anyone where he got the goods
and then fabricated an explanation when the police questioned him. The jury realized this and found him guilty.
As stated by this Court in State v. Roberts, 91 Utah 117,
63 P. 2d 584 ( 1937).
"The question of the credibility of the witnesses is for the jury and, if there is competent
. evidence upon which reasonable and unprejudicial

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
minds might draw different conclusions, the jury's
findings will not be disturbed." Id. at 588.
Based on the foregoing the state submits that there
was sufficient evidence to convict the appellant of receiving stolen property having a value in excess of fifty dollars.
POINT II.
THE STATE'S WITNESSES WERE NOT ACCOMPLICES TO MR. WASHINGTON AND NO
INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY ON AN ACCOMPLICE'S TESTIMONY WAS NECESSARY.
Counsel for Mr. Washington raises on appeal the refusal of the trial judge to instruct the jury on an accomplice's testimony. However, in the present case, the so
called accomplices were witnesses for the state, and the
appellant never sustained the burden of proving that these
witnesses were accomplices. As stated in State v. Bixby,
27 Wash. 2d 144, 177 P. 2d 689 (1947).
"Whether a person is an accomplice depends on
particular facts, and fact that one is an accomplice
must be shown by proof and burden is on defendant
to show that witness for the state is an accomplice."
Id. at 702. (Emphasis added.)
Respondent also contends that the so-called accomplices
by case definition were not accomplices in this particular
crime but simply witnesses for the state.
"An 'accomplice' is one who is or could be
charged as a principal with the defendant on trial."
State v. Bowman, 92 Utah 540, 70 P. 2d 458 (1937);
State v. Coroles, 74 Utah 94, 277 P. 203 (1929);
State v. Cragun, 85 Utah 149, 38 P. 2d 1071 ( 1934).
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Note that the accomplice must be charged as a principal
with the defendant. Thus, in our case the state's witnesses
must or could be, to qualify as accomplices to Washington,
charged as receiving stolen goods with the defendant. At
no point in the transcript is there any evidence of the socalled accomplices helping Washington in receiving stolen
property. They did not help him buy it, they did not help
him receive it - they did nothing that could tie them in
to his crime. They did buy and receive as gifts some items
from appellant. However, they never aided, assisted nor
participated with appellant in receiving the stolen property.
Case law states that even if the state's witnesses were
guilty of receiving stolen property, they would not be accomplices to appellant. Not one of them in any form helped
Washington in receiving the stolen goods. Their alleged
crime (if there was one) was completely different and
separate from that of his, the only thing in common would
be receiving the same stolen goods. Those witnesses simply
had nothing to do with Buddy Washington's offense. This
very point was brought out in State v. Bowman (supra
pg. 11).
"An 'accomplice' whose testimony needs corroboration under statute is one who is culpably implicated in commission of crime of which defendant
is accused." Id. at 548. (Emphasis added.)
The state's witnesses were not accomplices to the
offense committed by appellant of receiving stolen property in excess of $50.00 and on this basis no instruction
was needed by the jury with regard to corroboration of
accomplice's testimony.
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS J, K, AND L.
The trial court allowed into evidence Mr. Wade's credit
cards (Exhibits J, K, and L) and Washington's receipts for
the use of the credit cards, solely to impeach Mr. Washington. On this basis it is completely valid.
3 Wigmore, Evidence § 890 at 380 (3rd Ed. 1940)
states:
"The law is that a defendant taking the stand
as a witness may as a witness be impeached precisely like any other witness." (Emphasis added.)
The cases support Wigmore. In Booth v. State, 76 Okla. Cr.
410, 137 P. 2d 602 (1943), the Court said:
"When the defendant chose to testify he became
subject to the same rules of cross-examination and
impeachment as other witnesses and in this connection it was perfectly proper for the county attorney
to question him concerning prior convictions for the
purpose of affecting his credibility."
The trial judge was correct when he allowed the credit
cards into evidence for impeachment purposes only. Courts
have also held that specific acts (such as using stolen credit
cards) can be brought into evidence.
"Notwithstanding the general rule that a witness may not be impeached by evidence of specific
acts of bad character, as distinguished from evidence of general reputation for truth, honesty or
integrity, evidence or particular wrongful acts may

be admissible where the issue goes beyond general
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reputation of a witness and involves truthfulness as
to the basic fact in issue." State v. Hurlburt, 166
Cal. App. 2d 334, 333 P. 2d 82 at 85 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
Based on legal authority and cases cited, there is no
doubt that Exhibits J, K, and L were legally and properly
brought into evidence.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON A LESSER
OFFENSE.
The appellant feels the jury should have been instructed on a lesser offense, i.e., that if the stolen goods
were less than $50.00 Washington could only be convicted
of a misdemeanor. The court failed to instruct the jury to
a lesser offense for the very reason stated in a case used
by appellant - the evidence failed to justify a verdict on
a lesser offense, State v. ·valdez, 19 Utah 2d 426, 432 P. 2d
53 (1967). The value of the goods stolen by appellant when
new exceeded $1265.00. Among the goods stolen was a
color television, a black and white television, and a black
persian lamb coat. None were more than two years old.
There was obviously more than $50.00 worth of goods and
the judge did not deem it necessary to so instruct the jury.
As stated by this Court in State v. Valdez, supra (see also
appellant's brief, pg. 17) :
"As a general rule the trial court should submit to the jury included offenses where the evidence
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would justify such a verdict." Id. at 54. (Emphasis

added.)

The respondent submits that the trial judge followed
established Utah Supreme Court rules in refusing to instruct the jury to a lesser offense (receiving stolen goods
under $50.00) when it was obvious that evidence (had
goods with value new in excess of $1265.00) supported the
crime for which Washington was indicted.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT SENTENCED APPELLANT TO BEING AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL
ACCORDING TO ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
AND UTAH LAW.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-10 ( 1953) reads:
"Whoever has been previously twice convicted
of felonies, sentenced and committed to any prison,
shall, upon conviction of a felony committed in this
state, other than murder in the first or second degree, be deemed to be an habitual criminal, and
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for not less than fifteen years; provided, that
if the person so convicted shall show to the satisfaction of the court before which such conviction is
had that he was released from imprisonment upon
either of such sentences upon a pardon granted on
the ground that he was innocent, such conviction
and sentence shall not be considered as such under
this section."
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The statute is very precise, anyone convicted of two
prior felonies, who is convicted for a third felony is an
habitual criminal. Pursuant to that statute Mr. Stratford
brought in Mr. James Johnson, records and identification
officer at the Utah State Prison. Mr. Johnson brought Exhibits 1 and 2 with him from the state prison. Mr. Johnson
testified that these exhibits were copies of commitments
on Buddy Washington, taken by him from his files at the
Utah State Prison (T. 145; 146). Mr. Johnson testified
that the originals of each commitment were kept in each
prisoner's file at the prison by himself (T. 145, 146). Mr.
Johnson also testiifed that he received appellant for imprisonment on one felony (T. 150) and produced a receipt
from another officer who received Washington for another
and earlier felony (T. 150). Those coupled with the present
conviction is ample proof that Buddy Washington is an
habitual criminal. Appellant attempts to question evidence
(copies of the commitments) that was and is used daily to
put and confine prisoners in the Utah State Prison. These
are official state records and are admissible. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-25-3 ( 1953).
Counsel for appellant raises objection to his being sentenced for being both an habitual criminal and receiving
stolen goods in excess of $50.00. He claims the court erred
in sentencing appellant twice for a single offense. However, he cites Utah cases which state that being an habitual
criminal is a status and is not being charged with a crime.
(State v. Wood, 2 Utah 2d 34, 368 P. 2d 998 (1954)). If being an habitual criminal is a status and not a crime, it fol-
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lows that appellant was sentenced once for one crime and
sentenced once for his status as an habitual criminal-which
does not inflict further punishment for that crime. Appellant was sentenced to 5 years for his crime of receiving
stolen goods in excess of $50.00 and 15 years for his status
as an habitual criminal. As stated in Zeimer v. Turner, 14
Utah 2d 232, 381 P. 2d 721 (1962).
"Being an habitual criminal is a status, and to
be charged with being an habitual criminal is not
to be charged with a crime. The habitual criminal
statute will apply only upon a conviction of the
criminal offense last charged. Its invocation does
not inflict additional or further punishment for the
prior conviction or impose a new punishment therefor. It only serves to make more severe the punishment for the last or subsequent offense which might
be imposed because of the previous convictions."
Id. at 723. (Emphasis added.)
This is completely constitutional and valid under Utah
Supreme Court decisions. Appellant committed a crime,
and due to his previous convictions he is by status an
habitual criminal.
CONCLUSION
The respondent respectfully submits that the lower
court decision should be upheld. Appellant was given a
fair and impartial trial. Through the evidence presented
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and the testimony given, all of which were completely
proper and justified, it is apparent that appellant was guilty
of the crime as charged and was properly found to be in the
status of an habitual criminal.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

LAUREN N. BEASLEY

Chief Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent
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